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When countries liberalize their stock markets, firms that become eligible for foreign purchase 
(investible), experience an average stock price revaluation of 15.1 percent.  Since the historical 
covariance of the average investible firm’s stock return with the local market is roughly 200 
times larger than its historical covariance with the world market, liberalization reduces the 
systematic risk associated with holding investible securities.  Consistent with this fact: (1) the 
average effect of the reduction in systematic risk is 6.8 percentage points, or roughly two fifths 
of the total revaluation; and (2) the firm-specific revaluations are directly proportional to the 














Asset pricing theory predicts that capital will be allocated in such a way that risk-adjusted returns 
are equalized across assets.  Levels of expected stock returns should vary cross-sectionally 
according to the degree of firm exposure to systematic risk (Sharpe (1964)).  Research from the 
last several years provides little empirical evidence to support this prediction.  Systematic risk 
factors show little indication that they are priced cross-sectionally, and many firm characteristics 
that are priced cross-sectionally do not resemble systematic risk (Fama (1991), Cochrane (1999), 
Campbell (2000)).  
This paper adopts a different approach to the question of whether risk matters for asset 
prices.  Instead of testing the implication of the theory in levels, the paper focuses on changes in 
levels.  It does so by examining a natural experiment—stock market liberalization.  A stock 
market liberalization is a decision by a country’s government to allow foreigners to purchase 
shares in that country’s stock market.  Liberalizing a country’s stock market changes the relevant 
source of systematic risk for pricing stocks from the local stock market index to a world stock 
market index.  Consequently, expected returns should also change when countries liberalize. 
Theory predicts that the direction of the change in expected returns will be firm specific.  
Expected returns will fall for firms whose exposure to systematic risk decreases and rise for 
those whose exposure increases.  The change in expected returns will be reflected in stock prices.  
For example, a fall in a firm’s expected return will cause an increase in its stock price.  Since 
stock prices are observable, liberalization delivers a testable, cross-sectional implication of the 
theory.  Specifically, define the variable DIFCOV as follows: The historical covariance of a 
firm’s stock return with the local market index, minus the historical covariance of the firm’s 
stock return with the world market index.  All else equal, high DIFCOV firms should experience 
greater repricing than low DIFCOV firms.   
 3
Now, when countries liberalize, some publicly listed firms become eligible for foreign 
ownership (investible firms), while others remain off limits (non-investible firms).  The 
investible/non-investible distinction provides two additional testable implications.  First, take 
two firms that are identical except that one is investible and the other is not.  Theory predicts that 
the stock price revaluations of the investible firms should be more strongly correlated with 
DIFCOV than the revaluations of the non-investible firms.  The sample average of DIFCOV for 
investible firms is 0.018.  We estimate that such an investible firm will experience a firm-
specific revaluation of 6.8 percent during liberalization.  In contrast, there is no firm-specific 
revaluation for non-investible firms.   
Second, in addition to the firm-specific change, liberalization will also induce a common 
shock to expected returns—a fall in the risk-free rate as the country moves from financial 
autarky to financial integration with the rest of the world.  Since the fall in the risk-free rate is a 
common shock to all firms in the economy, it should be the same across investible and non-
investible firms.  Empirically, this means that the common shock experienced by investible firms 
should be statistically indistinguishable from the common shock experienced by the non-
investible firms. 
Our estimations confirm that the common shock is the same for both sets of firms.  The 
intercept term in our regressions measures the common shock.  The intercept ranges from 5.9 
percent to 9.1 percent in alternative specifications.  All of the regressions also include a dummy 
variable for investible firms.  The investible dummy is statistically insignificant in all 
specifications, indicating that the common shock is indeed the same for the investible and non-
investible firms, as predicted by the theory. 
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The use of firm-level data in this paper departs from studies that use aggregate data to 
document the stock market revaluations that occur when emerging economies liberalize (Henry 
(2000a, 2003), Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Kim and Singal (2000)).  The evidence in these 
papers suggests that liberalizations substantially reduce the cost of capital.  However, these 
papers are silent about whether any of this reduction stems from increased risk sharing.  In 
principle, the observed revaluations could be driven entirely by changes in the risk-free rate. 
The problem is that we observe only one aggregate stock price revaluation per country 
when liberalizations occur.  Therefore, analyses of aggregate data do not provide sufficient 
degrees of freedom with which to disentangle the contribution of changes in the risk-free rate 
from changes in risk sharing.  In contrast, firm-level data provide more than sufficient degrees of 
freedom with which to disentangle the two effects. 
The liberalization experiment also delivers power to detect cross-sectional relations 
between expected returns and covariances that are hard to detect in general.  Covariances are 
measured with error.  Measurement error reduces the statistical power of any regression.  One 
way of circumventing the measurement problem is to focus on a setting where the true variation 
is large relative to any noise in the data.  Liberalizations provide just such a setting (Frankel, 
1994).  In principle, the impact on expected returns of opening an emerging economy to foreign 
capital flows is large (Lucas (1990) and Stulz (1999a)).  Therefore, the magnitude of the 
liberalization-induced changes in expected returns may simply dominate the attenuating effects 
of measurement error that usually plague efforts to find cross-sectional pricing relations. 
While firm-level data offer distinct advantages relative to aggregate data, there are 
several reasons why the results need to be interpreted with caution.  The first concern is that the 
repricing of stocks during liberalization may not reflect risk sharing, but price pressure.  In the 
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context of liberalization, price pressure would manifest itself in the following way.  A country 
liberalizes.  Foreigners are permitted to invest in a subset of that country’s firms.  These 
investible firms get included in an emerging market index, which increases demand and drives 
up their prices a la Shleifer (1986) and Harris and Guerel (1986).   
The investible/non-investible feature of our data helps address this concern.  If price 
pressure is operative, then investible firms should experience a common shock that is larger than 
that of the non-investible firms—a combination of the fall in the risk-free rate and price pressure.  
Since the common shock is the same for both groups of firms, index-inclusion-induced price 
pressure does not appear to drive our results.  We also test alternative versions of the price 
pressure story, none of which seem to explain our findings.  
The second concern is that the decision to liberalize may be endogenous—policy makers 
may choose to open up when the stock market is doing well.  Endogeneity may bias estimates of 
the mean liberalization effect in aggregate studies, but with cross-country, firm-level data, the 
bias will be picked up by the country-specific fixed effects.  However, if the bias also has a 
component that is correlated with the firm-specific covariance structure of returns, then the point 
estimates may overstate the fraction of the revaluation that is due to increased risk sharing.  On 
the other hand, the results may understate the full impact of liberalization, because the 
revaluation is measured as the stock price change that occurs on the implementation date.  The 
market may anticipate liberalizations, and prices may have adjusted prior to that date. 
Third, stock price revaluations may be driven by changes in expected returns or future 
cash flows.  Unexpected stock price changes are a reasonable proxy for changes in expected 
returns only if earnings growth is unaltered by liberalization.  The analysis uses firm-level data 
on the actual growth rate of real earnings per share to control for changes in expected future cash 
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flows.  Studies that focus on aggregate data use variables such as GDP growth rates to proxy for 
expected future cash flows.  In comparison, firm-level data on actual earnings growth outcomes 
would seem to provide a more direct, albeit imperfect, measure of future earnings prospects.  
Despite these limitations, the evidence is useful for evaluating whether stock prices 
respond to changes in risk sharing.  It is important to understand whether stock prices respond to 
changes in risk sharing, because stock prices provide public signals of real investment 
opportunities (Fischer and Merton (1984), Tobin and Brainard (1977), Summers (1985)).1  If 
liberalization decreases the riskiness of a firm, then, all else equal, its stock price should 
increase.  The price increase signals to managers that they can increase shareholder welfare by 
investing in physical capital.  On the other hand, if liberalizations are associated with stock price 
increases that are unrelated to changes in risk, then the optimal investment response is less clear 
(Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)).  Therefore, 
analyzing whether stock prices move in line with changes in systematic risk also provides a first 
step towards understanding whether physical investment is efficiently reallocated when countries 
reduce barriers to international capital movements. 
 
I. Theoretical Motivation and Descriptive Findings 
The analysis builds on Stulz (1999c).2  Assume a small country whose equity market is 
completely segmented from world equity markets.  Also assume that all investors in the world 
are risk averse and care only about the expected return and variance of their investment.  Since 
domestic investors care only about the expected return and volatility of their portfolio, it follows 
that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) will hold.  For any individual stock in the 
segmented equity market we have: 
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[ ] ( [ ] )i f iM M fE R r E R rβ= + −! !                                                         (1) 
where [ ]iE R!  is the required rate of return on firm 'i s  stock, fr  is the risk-free rate in the 
domestic market, iMβ  is the beta coefficient of firm i with the domestic market portfolio before 
liberalization, and [ ]ME R!  is the expected return on the domestic market.   
The aggregate risk premium on the small country’s equity market before stock market 
liberalization, ( [ ] )M fE R r−! , can be written as 
2[ ] ( )M f ME R r Wγ σ− =! , where ( )Wγ  is the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion and 2Mσ  is the variance of the return on the small country’s 
market portfolio.  Assume that all investors have constant relative risk aversion, so that 
( )Wγ γ= .  It follows that the risk premium for firm i  before liberalization is 2iM Mβ γσ .  
Therefore, we may write:  
2[ ]i f iM ME R r β γσ= +! .                                                                     (2) 
A.  Complete Liberalization 
Now consider the impact on firm 'i s  required rate of return when the country opens its 
stock market to the rest of the world and also allows its residents to invest abroad.  Assume also 
that the expected value and variance of the profits from domestic production activities are 
unaltered by the liberalization.   
After liberalization, the small country’s equity market becomes part of the global equity 
market and expands the diversification opportunities for foreign investors.  Since foreign 
investors can invest in the country’s stock market and domestic investors can invest abroad, the 
risks associated with domestic production are now borne by both foreign and domestic investors.  
Note that adding a small country to the world portfolio has a negligible effect on the risk 
premium of the world market portfolio. 
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With completely open capital markets, the relevant source of systematic risk becomes the 
world market.  Therefore, the CAPM holds for the world market and the risk premium on any 
risky asset is proportional to its world beta.  Let *[ ]iE R!  be the required rate of return on firm i  in 
the integrated capital market equilibrium.  It follows that 
* * *[ ] ( [ ] )i f iW W fE R r E R rβ= + −! !                                                         (3) 
where iWβ  denotes firm i ’s beta with the world market, [ ]WE R!  denotes the required rate of 
return on the world equity market portfolio, and *fr  the world risk-free rate.  Under our 
assumptions, the aggregate risk premium on the world market portfolio is 2Wγσ , where 2Wσ  is the 
variance of the return on the world portfolio.  Therefore, the required rate of return on firm i  
after liberalization is 
* * 2[ ]i f iW WE R r β γσ= +! .                                                         (4) 
The link between the liberalization-induced change in the required rate of return on firm 
i  and its diversification properties can now be made transparent.  Subtracting equation (4) from 
equation (2) and performing a step of algebra using the definitions of local and world betas 
yields the following result: 
* *[ ] [ ] [ ] ( )i i i f fE R E R E R r r DIFCOVγ∆ = − = − +! ! !                                        (5) 
where [ ]iE R∆ !  is the change in the required rate of return on impact and 
[ ( , ) ( , )]i M i WDIFCOV Cov R R Cov R R= −! ! ! ! .  Equation (5) highlights the two channels through 
which liberalization affects firm-level required rates of return.  The first effect, a change in the 
risk-free rate, is common to all firms.3  The second effect of liberalization is idiosyncratic to firm 
i  and depends on the covariance of firm i ’s stock return with the local market minus the 
covariance of firm i ’s stock return with the world market.   
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B.  Partial Liberalization 
In practice, we do not always see complete liberalizations.  So it is useful to examine the 
theoretical predictions that emerge due to two commonly observed departures from complete 
liberalization. 
 
B.1.  Departure I: Mild Segmentation 
The first departure is mild segmentation.  Mild segmentation occurs when governments 
introduce one restriction to the benchmark case of complete liberalization: While domestic 
investors are permitted to invest in the world market portfolio, foreign investors can hold only a 
subset of domestic securities. 
When a country moves from autarky to mild segmentation, the representative foreign 
investor becomes the marginal investor that determines the pricing of investible securities.  Since 
the world market portfolio is the relevant source of systematic risk for the foreign investors, the 
pricing of investible securities under mild segmentation will be identical to that under complete 
integration.  It follows that the revaluation of investible securities under mild segmentation will 
continue to be given by: * *[ ] [ ] [ ] ( )i i i f fE R E R E R r r DIFCOVγ∆ = − = − +! ! ! . 
What determines the revaluation of the non-investible securities?  Errunza and Losq 
(1985) consider this question in an environment where unrestricted domestic investors have a 
coefficient of risk aversion Uγ  and restricted foreign investors have a coefficient of risk aversion 
γ .  So long as the unrestricted domestic investors share the same coefficient of risk aversion as 
the restricted foreign investors, DIFCOV will continue to explain the repricing of non-investible 
securities.  In other words, when Uγ γ= , the repricing of non-investible securities under mild 
segmentation is given by: * *[ ] [ ] [ ] ( )i i i f fE R E R E R r r DIFCOVγ∆ = − = − +! ! ! . 
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In the case where the coefficient of risk aversion differs across domestic and foreign 
investors, the revaluation of the non-investible securities is given by:  
* *[ ] [ ] [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( )] ( , )i i i f f U i N IE R E R E R r r W DIFCOV W W Cov R R Rγ γ γ∆ = − = − + + −! ! ! ! ! !     (6) 
where NR!  and IR!  are the returns on the portfolio of non-investible and investible securities, 
respectively.  The variable ( , )i N ICov R R R! ! !  is the covariance of firm i ’s return with the return on 
the portfolio of non-investible stocks, taking the return on the investible securities as given.   
The last term on the right-hand-side of (6) is a “super risk premium,” which arises 
because of differing domestic and foreign risk aversion.  Intuitively, the super risk premium 
compensates domestic investors for bearing the risk associated with holding all of the non-
investible stocks.  Since this paper seeks to explain repricing without resorting to heterogeneity 
in risk aversion, we do not pursue the empirical implications of the super risk premium.  Instead, 
we now turn to the theoretical implications of the second departure from the benchmark case of 
complete liberalization. 
 
B.2.  Departure II:  Strong Segmentation 
Strong segmentation occurs when, in addition to mild segmentation, domestic investors 
are not allowed to invest in the world market portfolio.  In the move from autarky to strong 
segmentation, the revaluation of investible securities continues to be given by equation (5).  The 
reason is the same as under the move from autarky to mild segmentation.  Following 
liberalization, the marginal investor is the foreigner whose relevant source of systematic risk is 
the world market portfolio. 
What drives the change in the required rate of return for the non-investible securities?  
Here we get a different repricing relation than under mild segmentation, even when unrestricted 
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domestic investors have the same coefficient of risk aversion as the restricted foreign investors.   
By the definition of strong segmentation, domestic investors hold only domestic 
securities following the liberalization.  Hietala (1989) shows that under strong segmentation the 
required rate of return on any security held by a domestic investor in equilibrium is 
* *[ ] ( , )i f i DE R r Cov R Rγ= +! ! ! , where DR!  is the return on the post-liberalization portfolio of 
securities held by the representative domestic investor. 
It follows that the revaluation of any one of the securities in the domestic investor’s 
portfolio will be given by: 
* *[ ] [ ] [ ] ( )i i i f fE R E R E R r r DIFCOV1γ∆ = − = − +! ! !                                       (8) 
 
where [ ( , ) ( , )]i M i DDIFCOV1 Cov R R Cov R R= −! ! ! ! .  The domestic investor’s portfolio will be 
heavily tilted towards non-investible securities after liberalization (Hietala (1989)).  If the set of 
securities in the domestic investor’s portfolio is the same as the set of non-investible securities 
post liberalization, then equation (8) also yields the repricing relation for the non-investible 
securities. 
In other words, the repricing of the non-investible securities should be positively 
correlated with DIFCOV1, all else being equal.  This result has the following intuition.  Since the 
domestic investor cannot hold any foreign stocks, the post-liberalization portfolio of domestic 
securities constitutes the only relevant source of systematic risk.  Therefore, the lower the 
covariance of a given stock with the post-liberalization domestic portfolio, the more its required 
rate of return will tend to fall with the liberalization.4 
 
C.  Mapping Theory to Data: Descriptive Findings 
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Table I presents a decomposition of DIFCOV for the typical firm in the sample.  The 
table makes two central points.  First, Panel A shows that investible firms present the 
representative foreign investor with considerable scope for diversification.  Columns 4 and 5 
show that the covariance of the average investible firm’s stock return with the local market is 
roughly 185 times larger than its covariance with the world market.  In contrast, the magnitudes 
for the non-investible firms in Panel B are less striking.  Columns 4 and 5 of Panel B show that 
the covariance of the average non-investible firm’s stock return with the local market is only 10 
times larger than its covariance with the world market.   
[Insert Table I about here] 
Second, Columns 6 through 10 in both panels demonstrate the second point.  There are 
two key factors that drive the difference between local and world covariances: (1) The average 
firm’s correlation with the local market is roughly 10 times larger than its correlation with the 
world market—0.620 versus 0.060 for investible and 0.425 versus 0.048 for non-investible firms; 
(2) The average standard deviation of the local market, 0.142, is roughly three times as large as 
the standard deviation of the world market, 0.047, for both sets of firms.   
Under the assumption that firms’ expected future cash flows are unaffected by 
liberalization, the unexpected response of firm 'i s  stock price to news of the liberalization will 
mirror the change in the required rate of return on firm 'i s  stock.  The stock price will increase 
if liberalization lowers the required rate of return, and conversely, the stock price will decrease if 
liberalization raises the required rate of return. 
Accordingly, the unexpected stock price response to liberalization can be used to 
confront the theory with data.  Equation (5) predicts that the revaluation will have an intercept 
effect and a slope effect.  The intercept term should be the same across investible and non-
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investible firms within a given country.  Equation (5) also predicts that the revaluation should be 
an increasing function of DIFCOV.5 
Figure 1 reveals that the stock price revaluation for investible firms is an increasing 
function of DIFCOV, as theory predicts.  It plots the unexpected stock price change for 
investible firms on the y-axis and DIFCOV on the x-axis.  The statistical relationship between 
the revaluation of investible firms and DIFCOV is given by the following equation (robust t-
statistics in parentheses, R-Squared 0.27, N 248): 
ln( [0]) 0.05 9.20*Investibleij ijStockPrice DIFCOV∆ = − +                                          (9) 
                                                (-1.3)  (4.0) 
 
where ln( [0])InvestibleijStockPrice∆  is the liberalization-month stock price change for investible 
firm i  in country j .   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 2 presents the scatter plot for non-investible firms.  The statistical relationship 
between the revaluation of non-investible firms and DIFCOV is given by the following equation 
(robust t-statistics in parentheses, R-Squared 0.06, N 181): 
ln( [0]) 0.053 3.69*Non Investibleij ijStockPrice DIFCOV
−∆ = +                                   (10) 
(3.2) (2.3) 
 
where ln( [0])InvestibleijStockPrice∆  is the liberalization-month stock price change for non-
investible firm i  in country j .  Like Figure 1, this graph also reveals a positive statistical 
relation between the revaluation of non-investible firms and DIFCOV. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
However, there are also some distinct differences between Figure 1 and Figure 2.  First, 
the positive relation between the revaluation and DIFCOV is more pronounced for investible 
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firms (Figure 1) than non-investible firms (Figure 2).  The slope of the line in equation (5) is 
9.20, whereas the slope of the line in equation (6) is 3.69.  Second, the difference in covariance 
explains almost 30 percent of the cross-sectional variation in investible firms’ stock price 
revaluations, but only six percent for non-investible firms.  Thus, a first pass at the data indicates 
that DIFCOV has more predictive power for the revaluation of investible firms than non-
investible firms.   
Figure 3 examines whether the repricing of non-investible firms is related to the 
difference between their covariance with the local market portfolio and their covariances with 
the entire portfolio of non-investible securities.  The graph plots the unexpected stock price 
change for non-investible firms on the y-axis and DIFCOV1 on the x-axis.  The statistical 
relation between the revaluation of non-investible firms and DIFCOV1 is given by the following 
equation (robust t-statistics in parentheses, R-Squared 0.01, N 181): 
ln( [0]) 0.07 1.44* 1Non Investibleij ijStockPrice DIFCOV
−∆ = + .                                (11) 
(3.6) (1.5) 
 
It appears that DIFCOV1 has no explanatory power for the repricing of non-investible securities.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
This initial perusal of the data suggests that there are differences between investible and 
non-investible firms, but only so much can be inferred from pictures.  For example, the 
unexpected stock price change is a reasonable proxy for the change in required return if earnings 
growth is unchanged by liberalization.  If this assumption is not reasonable, then it may be 
important to control for changes in the expected growth rate of earnings. 
Additionally, there is a more general concern.  The goal is to estimate the impact of 
liberalization on a randomly selected firm from the population of all firms.  If the investible 
firms are not randomly selected, then they may have unobservable characteristics that cause them 
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to respond differently to liberalization than non-investible firms.  These issues can be explored 
more transparently once the data have been described in more detail.  This data description takes 
place in the next section of the paper. 
 
II.  Data 
The analysis requires three types of data: (1) stock returns for the liberalizing countries in 
question; (2) stock market liberalization dates; and (3) a means of discriminating between those 
firms that become eligible for foreign ownership when the market is liberalized and those that do 
not.  Section II.A describes the basic stock returns data.  Section II.B gives the stock market 
liberalization dates.  Section II.C explains the procedure for discriminating between investible 
and non-investible firms.  Section II.D presents descriptive statistics for the two sets of firms.  
Section II.E discusses the potential importance of selection bias issues in examining investible 
versus non-investible firms. 
 
A.  The Basic Stock Returns Series 
The principal source of stock market data is the International Finance Corporation’s 
(IFC) Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB).6 Stock price indices for individual firms are the 
dividend-inclusive, U.S. dollar-denominated, IFC Global Index (IFCG).  The IFC selects stocks 
for inclusion in the IFCG index by reviewing a stock’s trading activity.  Any share selected must 
be among the most actively traded shares in terms of value traded during the annual review 
period; it must have traded frequently during the review period (i.e., preventing one large block 
trade from skewing the value traded statistics); and it must have reasonable prospects for a 
continued trading presence in the stock exchange (e.g., it must not be in imminent danger of 
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being suspended or delisted).  Stocks are selected in order of trading criteria until the market 
capitalization coverage target of 60 to 75 percent of total market capitalization is met.  Once the 
actively traded and market capitalization requirements are met, IFC analysts may suggest 
substituting one company’s shares for another on the list if the suggested shares have reasonably 
similar trading characteristics, but represent an industry group which may be underrepresented in 
the current composition of the IFCG index (IFC (1999)).  
In order to be included in the sample, a firm must have been actively traded for at least 
five years prior to the liberalization date.  This ensures that there are at least five years worth of 
data with which to calculate historical covariances.  Each country’s U.S. dollar-denominated 
total return index is deflated by the U.S. consumer price index (CPI), which comes from the IFS.  
All of the data are monthly.  Returns are calculated as the first difference of the natural logarithm 
of the real stock total return index. 
Calculation of the covariance of firm-level stock returns with the local and world markets 
requires data on market returns as well as firm-level returns.  For each country, the real, dollar-
denominated IFCG Total Return Index is used as the benchmark local market index. The world 
benchmark market index is the real, dollar-denominated MSCI World Total Return Index. 
 
B.  Identifying Stock Market Liberalization Dates 
A stock market liberalization is a decision by a country’s government to open its stock 
market to foreign investors.  When a stock market liberalization occurs, some of the firms in the 
domestic economy become eligible for purchase by foreigners, while others remain off-limits.  
Establishing the liberalization date is the first step in the process of distinguishing between these 
two types of firms.  These dates are listed in Table II.  The entire sample consists of 410 firms in 
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11 countries.  The 11 countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Korea, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Taiwan, Turkey, and Venezuela. 
[Insert Table II about here] 
C. Discriminating Between Investible and Non-Investible Firms 
Investible firms are defined to be that subset of firms in the IFCG that are also in the IFC 
Investible Index (IFCI).  The IFCI’s determination of investibility is a three-step process.  First, 
the IFC determines which securities foreigners may legally hold.  Next, the IFC applies two 
further screening criteria for practicality of investment.  Both screens must be passed for IFCI 
index eligibility.  The first criterion screens for a minimum investible market capitalization of 
$50 million or more over the 12 months prior to a stock’s addition to an IFCI index.  This 
investible market capitalization is determined after applying the foreign investment rules and 
after any adjustments because of cross-holdings or government ownership. 
The second criterion screens firms for liquidity.  A stock must trade at least $20 million 
over the prior year for inclusion in an IFCI index.  It must also have traded on at least half the 
local exchange’s trading days.  Thus, the IFC Investible indexes are designed to measure the 
returns that foreign portfolio investors might receive from investing in emerging market 
securities that are legally and practically available to them. 
The IFCI was initiated in December of 1988.  This fact implies that for stock market 
liberalizations that occurred prior to December of 1988, it is not possible to discriminate between 
those firms that became investible and those that did not.  The countries and dates in Table II 
reflect this constraint.  Specifically, Table II lists the earliest stock liberalization date occurring 
after December of 1988 for every country that implemented at least one countrywide stock 
market liberalization after this date. 
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D.  Descriptive Statistics on Investible and Non-Investible Firms 
The average size of DIFCOV  is 0.018 for investible firms and 0.0096 for non-investible 
firms.  This feature of the data suggests that investible firms should experience larger 
revaluations than non-investible firms, given the common shock.  Table III explores whether the 
raw differences in the stock price revaluations of investible and non-investible firms are roughly 
consistent with this prediction.  The table shows that the average stock price revaluation is 15.1 
percent in real dollar terms for investible firms and 9.9 percent for non-investible firms.  The last 
column of the table reports that the 5.2 percentage-point difference between these two means is 
statistically significant.  There are two possible concerns with these numbers. 
[Insert Table III about here] 
First, they are reported in dollar terms.  This choice of unit may lead to an overstatement 
of the revaluations if liberalizations are accompanied by large appreciations of the domestic 
currency vis-à-vis the dollar.  In order to see if the dollar-denominated revaluations are driven by 
domestic currency gains, the behavior of exchange rates in the sample countries was examined.  
On average, countries actually experience a 1.2 percent depreciation of their exchange rates 
during the liberalization month.  The average depreciation during the month after liberalization is 
1.5 percent.  This suggests that the dollar-denominated numbers may actually understate the true 
size of the revaluation in local currency terms.  Second, the numbers may understate the true 
revaluations if the liberalization events are anticipated.7  Analysis of returns during the months 
preceding the liberalization revealed no evidence of significant stock price appreciation in 
anticipation of the liberalizations.   
Turning to comparisons of medians, the median revaluation for investible firms is 12.1 
percent.  Forty-three of the 248 investible firms in the sample had liberalization-month stock 
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price changes below their median monthly stock price change.  The p-value is 0.00 for observing 
at most this many investible firms with liberalization-month stock price responses below their 
median monthly stock price change for non-liberalization months.8  The median revaluation for 
non-investible firms is 8.6 percent.  Eighty-three of the 181 non-investible firms experienced 
liberalization-month stock price changes below their median monthly stock price change.  The p-
value is 0.15 for observing at most this many stock price responses below the median.  Hence, 
sign tests confirm that the stock price revaluations for investible firms are more uniformly 
positive than for non-investible firms. 
 
E.  Is There a Sample Selection Problem? 
Those firms that become investible may not represent a random sampling from the 
distribution of all firms in the IFCG, which are themselves not randomly selected.  To explore 
whether selection bias may prejudice the results, this section systematically examines the 
structural differences between investible and non-investible firms.   
Table IV provides a comparison of ex ante observable differences in investible and non-
investible firms, as a second step in exploring the extent to which selection bias may prejudice 
inferences about the differential impact of liberalization on the two sets of firms.  Summary 
statistics on six variables are provided for investible and non-investible firms in the pre-
liberalization period: SIZE, market capitalization as a fraction of total market capitalization; 
LIQUIDITY, the turnover rate; EARNINGS, the growth rate of real earnings per share; 
MARKET TO BOOK, the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity; 
RETURN, the average real return in dollars; and DIFCOV, the difference in covariance between 
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the local and world markets.  There is no significant difference between the size of investible and 
non-investible firms.  Investible firms are significantly more liquid than non-investible firms. 
[Insert Table IV about here] 
The average growth rate of real earnings per share for investible firms is significantly 
higher than that of non-investible firms.  Investible firms also have significantly higher market-
to-book ratios than non-investible firms.  This may indicate that investible firms have higher 
expected future profitability than non-investible firms.  If higher market-to-book ratios and 
historical growth rates of real earnings per share rationally forecast that investible firms have 
higher expected profitability than non-investible firms, then we should see differences in ex post 
earnings growth outcomes, on average. 
Hence, Table V reports a comparison of the actual growth rate of real earnings per share 
for investible and non-investible firms in each of the three years following liberalization ([+1], 
[+2], [+3]), as a further means of exploring selection bias.  In the second and third years after 
liberalization, there are no significant differences.  In the year after liberalization, the growth rate 
of earnings per share for non-investible firms is significantly lower than for investible firms.  
Although there are no dramatic differences in ex post profitability of investible and non-
investible firms, overall the data do suggest that there are some differences between these two 
types of firms.  The empirical analysis in Section IV controls directly for the influence of 
earnings on the revaluations, so some of these differences will be accounted for.  However, it is 
possible that these differences could be correlated with characteristics that influence the way in 
which investible and non-investible stock prices respond to liberalization. 
[Insert Table V about here] 
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Another possible concern is the process by which firms become legally investible.  If 
decisions concerning the permissibility of foreign ownership are made at the country level (by 
government officials), then stock market liberalization may be an exogenous event from the 
perspective of any given firm.  On the other hand, if legal investibility is determined on a firm-
by-firm basis, then sample selection may be an issue.  For example, if a firm must lobby the 
government to allow foreign institutions to buy its shares, then those firms that are most 
attractive to foreigners will be most likely to engage in the lobbying process.  This discussion 
suggests that those firms that are “investible” may not represent a random sampling from the 
distribution of all firms in the IFCG.   
The extent to which liberalization may be regarded as exogenous was investigated.  The 
variation in the “degree open factor” across firms for each country was examined.  For 10 of the 
11 countries in the sample, the degree open factor was identical across all firms at the time of the 
stock market liberalization.9  The uniformity of the degree of openness across firms within a 
given country suggests that either the liberalization decision is exogenous to any given firm, or 
all firms within a given country uniformly prefer the same degree of permissible foreign 
ownership.  However, the government’s decision about which firms to make investible may be a 
function of firm-specific characteristics that determine the likely impact of liberalization on that 
firm, even if the liberalization decision is exogenous from the firm’s perspective. 
 
III.  Methodology and Empirical Results 
This section of the paper addresses the following question:  Do diversification 
fundamentals help predict the unexpected stock price change in response to the news of stock 
market liberalization?  The benchmark regression specification is as follows: 
 22
1 1 2ln( [0]) ( * )
.
ij ij ij ij
j ij
StockPrice INVEST DIFCOV DIFCOV INVEST
COUNTRY
α β γ γ
ε
∆ = + + +
+ +
        (12) 
The left-hand-side variable is the Month “0” unexpected stock price change.  Month 0 is 
defined as the implementation month of a given liberalization.  The IFC records the value of a 
country’s stock market index at the end of the month, and the data on liberalization events do not 
provide the day of the month on which programs are implemented.  These two facts imply that 
the implementation of a given liberalization may occur after the day of the month on which the 
IFC recorded prices.  In such cases, the change in the stock market index in month [0] may not 
reflect the news of the liberalization event.  Accordingly, the analysis looks at the cumulative 
unexpected change in the real dollar value of the stock market index in months [0, +1] as well as 
the change in month [0].  The unexpected stock price change for a given firm, i , is computed as 
the real dollar return for firm i  in the liberalization month minus firm i ’s average, pre-
liberalization, monthly return. 
The symbol DIFCOV is an abbreviation for [ ( , ) ( , )]i M i WCov R R Cov R R− , the difference 
between the historical covariance of firm i ’s stock return with the local market and its 
covariance with the MSCI world stock market index.  The variable INVEST is a dummy variable 
that takes on a value of one for investible firms, and zero for non-investible firms.  The 
coefficient on DIFCOV gives the effect of risk sharing conditional on being non-investible.  The 
coefficient on DIFCOV*INVEST gives the marginal effect of risk sharing conditional on being 
investible.  The sum of the coefficients on DIFCOV and DIFCOV*INVEST gives the total effect 
of risk sharing conditional on being investible.  COUNTRY is a set of country-specific dummies 
to account for country-fixed effects. 
The regression specification in equation (12) facilitates examination of the revaluation 
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effect for a pooled group of 410 investible and non-investible firms.  The joint estimation 
procedure allows testing of the view that risk sharing drives the stock price revaluations that 
accompany stock market liberalizations for both investible and non-investible firms.  The 
constant intercept term, α , imposes the assumption that the change in the risk-free rate is the 
same across all countries, after controlling for country-fixed effects.  If the theory is correct, α  
should be the same for investible and non-investible firms.  The coefficient on the dummy 
variable INVEST measures the marginal effect on α  of being investible.  If the theory is correct, 
the coefficient on INVEST should not be significantly different from zero. 
In principle, estimating equation (12) without country-fixed effects would yield an 
estimate of the average change in the risk-free rate across all 11 countries.  In practice, an 
estimate of α  without fixed effects could pick up other level effects related to country-specific 
differences that are not addressed by the theory.  Without a clear framework for interpreting such 
differences, it seems preferable not to try to interpret the country-fixed effects as country-specific 
changes in the risk-free rate.  Rather, the empirical analysis simply asks whether the common 
shock is the same across all firms after controlling for country-fixed effects.   
The usual assumption that the error term is random and uncorrelated across firms requires 
further discussion.  Equation (12) is estimated using a panel regression with country-fixed 
effects.  When aggregating abnormal returns, typical event studies assume that abnormal returns 
are not correlated across firms.  Assuming no correlation across firms means that the covariance 
between individual firm abnormal returns is zero.  Therefore, standard distributional results may 
be used to calculate the variance of aggregated abnormal returns.  The assumption is reasonable 
if the event dates for individual firms do not overlap in calendar time. 
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However, in the case of a liberalization event, all firms in a country share an identical 
event date.  Therefore, the covariances between individual firm abnormal returns may not be 
zero, in which case the standard distributional results no longer obtain.  We address this problem 
of clustering in the standard fashion—by relaxing the assumption that abnormal returns are not 
correlated across firms.  Specifically, we allow the off-diagonal (covariance) elements in the 
variance-covariance matrix to be different from zero.  In short, the clustering procedure produces 
standard errors that are appropriately adjusted to reflect the cross-firm correlation of abnormal 
returns.  The estimation procedure also corrects for potential heteroskedasticity across firms. 
 
A.  Benchmark Regression Results 
Table VI shows the results.  Panel A presents the estimates for the month [0] windows.  
Column (1a) shows the results for the benchmark specification given by equation (12).  The 
estimate of the constant captures the common shock for both the investible and the non-
investible firms.  The magnitude of this coefficient is 0.059 and is significant at the one-percent 
confidence level.  The INVEST dummy is statistically insignificant.  This suggests that the 
common shock is in fact the same for both sets of firms, as theory would predict. 
[Insert Table VI about here] 
The coefficient on DIFCOV gives the effect of risk sharing conditional on being non-
investible.  The estimate is 0.331 and is statistically insignificant.  Risk sharing does not explain 
the repricing for the non-investible firms.  On the other hand, conditional on being investible, the 
marginal effect of risk sharing conditional is an important determinant of repricing.  The estimate 
of the coefficients on DIFCOV*INVEST is 2.41 and significant at the one-percent level.  The 
sum of the coefficients on DIFCOV and DIFCOV*INVEST gives the total effect of risk sharing 
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on the repricing of investible firms, 2.74.  This means that if DIFCOV equals 0.01, then an 
investible firm can expect a stock price revaluation of 0.0274 or 2.74 percent in the month that 
the liberalization takes place. 
Panel B presents the estimates for the month [0, +1] window.  Column (1b) presents the 
estimates from the benchmark specification.  Consistent with the results in Panel A, risk sharing 
is not a significant predictor of repricing for the non-investible firms.  The estimate of DIFCOV 
is –0.4 statistically insignificant.  In contrast, the conditional effect for the investible firms is 
significant.  The point estimate of DIFCOV*INVEST is 4.42 and significant at the one-percent 
level.  The total effect of risk sharing for the investible firms, the sum of DIFCOV and 
DIFCOV*INVEST, is 4.02.  Therefore, if DIFCOV equals 0.01, an investible firm can expect a 
total stock price revaluation of 4.02 percent over the two-month window.  
It is important to reiterate that the marginal effect of DIFCOV conditional on being an 
investible firm is captured by the coefficient on DIFCOV*INVEST.  Therefore, the point 
estimates in the benchmark specifications (1a and 1b) also indicate that the marginal effect of 
DIFCOV for investible firms is significantly different from that of the non-investible firms.  
Overall, the benchmark estimates suggest that the stock price revaluation of investible firms is 
positively and significantly related to risk sharing.  There is no significant statistical relation 
between the stock price revaluation of non-investible firms and diversification fundamentals. 
 
B. Controlling for Earnings Growth  
Stock price revaluations may be driven by changes in earnings or discount rates.  If 
liberalization coincides with good news about earnings, then firms may experience stock price 
revaluations that are unrelated to liberalization-induced changes in the discount rate.  
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Specifications (2a) and (2b) of Table VI explore whether the differences in the effect of risk 
sharing on the stock price revaluation of investible and non-investible firms reported in 
specifications (1a) and (1b) are driven by shocks to the growth rate of earnings.  The deviation of 
the growth rate of earnings from its pre-liberalization mean in year [+1] is added to the right-
hand-side of equation (12) as a proxy for changes in expected future profitability.10 
After controlling for earnings in Panel A, the sum of the coefficients on DIFCOV and 
DIFCOV*INVEST is 2.67, and statistically significant at the five-percent level.  After 
controlling for earnings in Panel B, the sum of the coefficients on DIFCOV and 
DIFCOV*INVEST is 3.54, and significant at the five-percent level.  Therefore, risk sharing 
continues to explain the repricing of investible firms even after controlling for earnings growth.  
The point estimate on DIFCOV, the risk-sharing effect for non-investible firms, remains 
statistically insignificant in both Panel A and Panel B. 
 
C.  Can Price Pressure Explain the Results? 
Another potential concern is that the repricing of stocks during liberalization may not 
reflect risk sharing, but price pressure.  In the context of our liberalization experiment, price 
pressure would manifest itself in the following way.  A country liberalizes.  Foreigners are 
permitted to invest in a subset of that country’s firms.  These investible firms gets included in an 
emerging market index, which increases demand and drives up their prices a la Shleifer (1986) 
and Harris and Guerel (1986).   
The investible/non-investible feature of our data helps to address the price pressure 
concern in two ways.  First, if index-inclusion-induced price pressure is operative, then investible 
firms should experience a common shock that is larger than that of the non-investible firms—a 
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combination of the fall in the risk-free rate and price pressure.  Since the common shock is the 
same for both groups of firms, index-inclusion-induced price pressure does not drive our results.   
It is also important to remember that price pressure is a concern only to the extent that it 
is positively correlated with DIFCOV.  While it is plausible that price pressure—caused by the 
aggregate inflow of capital—exists at the country level, the use of firm level data helps to allay 
this concern.  The theoretical rationale for price pressure at the firm level is unclear.  While it is 
not obvious why price pressure should be positively correlated with DIFCOV, the 
investible/non-investible feature of the data allows us to devise a second test of the price pressure 
hypothesis that directly addresses the issue. 
Specifically, we conduct the second test of the price pressure hypothesis within the class 
of investible firms.  Regulatory guidelines within asset management companies often restrict 
portfolio managers to holding stocks that are included in investible indices such as IFCI.  In 
order to be included in the IFCI, firms must pass minimum size and liquidity screens, in addition 
to being legally investible.  Since large and liquid firms are more likely to be candidates for 
index inclusion than small illiquid ones, large and liquid firms may experience more price 
pressure.  Therefore, to the extent that DIFCOV is positively correlated with size or liquidity, our 
results may overstate the effects of diversification. 
In order to account for the potential impact that size and liquidity may have on the 
results, this subsection adds size and turnover measures to the right-hand-side of equation (12).  
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For a given firm, SIZE is defined as the ratio of that firm’s market capitalization to the total 
domestic market capitalization as of one year prior to the liberalization date. 
Regression (3a) in Panel A of Table VI shows that risk sharing remains an important 
determinant of the repricing of investible firms, after controlling for size.  The coefficient on 
DIFCOV*INVEST is 2.38, and significant at the five-percent level.  The sum of the coefficients 
on DIFCOV and DIFCOV*INVEST is 2.61.  Similarly, in Panel B, the coefficient on 
DIFCOV*INVEST is 3.71, and significant at the five-percent level.  The coefficients on 
DIFCOV and DIFCOV*INVEST is 3.45.  In both Panels A and B, risk sharing has no 
explanatory power for the repricing of the non-investible firms.  The coefficient on DIFCOV 
remains statistically insignificant.  The coefficient on the SIZE variable is not significant in any 
of the specifications. 
The following regression explores whether the positive relation between the unexpected 
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For a given firm, the variable TURNOVER is defined as the sum of the dollar value of all shares 
traded over a 12-month period before the liberalization (t -24 to t -12) divided by that firm’s total 
market capitalization.  The total market capitalization number for the firm is taken at t-12.   
Regression (4a) in Panel A of Table VI shows that after controlling for the effect of 
liquidity on the stock price revaluation for investible firms, the sum of the coefficients on 
DIFCOV and DIFCOV*INVEST is 2.95, and significant at the five-percent level.  Regression 
(4b) in Panel B of Table VI shows that the sum of the coefficients on DIFCOV and 
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DIFCOV*INVEST is 3.69, and significant at the one-percent level.  In both Panels A and B, the 
conditional effect of DIFCOV for non-investible firms remains statistically insignificant.  The 
coefficient on DIFCOV*INVEST indicates that the marginal effect of DIFCOV for investible 
firms continues to be significantly larger than that of the non-investible firms.  The variable 
TURNOVER is statistically insignificant for the investible firms and enters negatively and 
significantly for the non-investible firms.  Specifications (5a) and (5b) indicate that risk sharing 
remains a significant explanatory variable for the repricing of investible firms, when 
simultaneously controlling for earning, size, and liquidity. 
 
D.  Alternative Measures of Abnormal Returns 
The specifications in Table VI control for country-fixed effects and firm-specific shocks 
such as earnings, size and liquidity.  However, there may be common world shocks, for which 
we have not yet accounted.  For example, suppose that liberalizations occur when times are good 
for international products, so that during liberalization periods, firms that produce international 
products experience abnormally high returns.  Since firms whose output have a large proportion 
of international products are likely to be correlated with the world market, the coefficient 
estimates of DIFCOV*INVEST in Table VI may not reflect risk sharing, but rather the exposure 
of domestic firms to the international product shock.  The controls on future earnings help 
somewhat with this problem, but the proxy for expected future earnings is noisy and cannot 
entirely eliminate the concern.   
In order to account for common global shocks we construct two additional measures of 
abnormal returns that are adjusted for world market exposure.  First, we calculate the abnormal 
return as a firm’s return in the liberalization month minus the return on the MSCI world index in 
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the liberalization month.  Second, we calculate a risk-adjusted return using historical world 
market exposure.  Specifically, abnormal returns are estimated using a world market return 
model, which is estimated in the pre-liberalization window using the MSCI world index.  The 
pre-liberalization window consists of returns in the t -72 to t 0 window.    
Table VII presents the results obtained from estimating specifications (1a and 1b) through 
(5a and 5b) using the first additional measure of abnormal returns as the left-hand-side variable.  
Table VIII presents the results obtained from estimating specifications (1a and 1b) through (5a 
and 5b) using the second additional measure of abnormal returns.  Both sets of estimates 
corroborate the evidence from the baseline estimates in Table VI.  After controlling for earnings 
size, and liquidity, the point estimate of DIFCOV*INVEST remains statistically significant at the 
5-percent level. 
[Insert Tables VII and VIII about here] 
E.  Summary 
On balance, the evidence suggests that risk sharing helps explain the revaluation effect 
for investible firms only.  The marginal effect of risk sharing for investible firms, the coefficient 
on DIFCOV*INVEST, is statistically significant in all specifications.  In contrast, the effect of 
risk sharing on non-investible firms is never significant.  The hypothesis that the impact of risk 
sharing on the stock price revaluation is the same for investible and non-investible firms is 
rejected in the benchmark specification as well as those that include controls for earnings, size, 
and liquidity.  The common shock, as measured by the coefficient on the constant term, is 
positive and significant in all specifications.  Importantly, the marginal effect of INVEST on the 
constant term is statistically insignificant in all but one specification.  This suggests that the 
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intercept term is in fact the same for investible and non-investible firms.  This second piece of 
evidence provides further confirming evidence in support of the theory. 
It is useful to check the plausibility of the results by performing some crude calculations.  
For investible firms, the sample average of DIFCOV is 0.018.  Multiplying this number by 3.59, 
the total effect of risk sharing on investible firms after controlling for other factors (specification 
(5b) in Table VI), gives 0.065.  This number is the total repricing effect due to risk sharing for 
the average investible firm.  The average revaluation in the raw data for investible firms is 15 
percent (Table III).  In other words, roughly two fifths of the typical investible firm’s revaluation 
can be explained by risk sharing.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
Typical analyses of the gains from trade in risky assets calibrate the hypothetical welfare 
losses associated with the lack of international risk sharing (French and Poterba (1991), Obstfeld 
(1994), Lewis (1999, 2000), and Tesar (1995).11  This paper takes a different approach.  It 
measures the extent to which risk sharing drives the revaluation of stock prices that actually 
occurs when countries open their stock markets to foreign investors.  Strictly speaking, 
revaluations measure the changes in real wealth that accrue to domestic shareholders, not utility 
gains per se.  But revaluations have an important advantage in that they provide a direct 
empirical test of the view that there are gains to international risk sharing. 
The data show that firm-specific risk sharing characteristics (DIFCOV) account for 
roughly two fifths of the revaluation of the typical investible stock.  In contrast, Morck, Yeung, 
and Yu (2000) find that in general stock returns in emerging economies contain little firm-
specific information.  These two seemingly contrary findings need not be mutually inconsistent.  
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Changes in emerging market stock prices may convey little firm-specific information in general, 
but the evidence in this paper shows that they do convey information about firm-specific changes 
in risk sharing during liberalization episodes.   
While asset prices move in response to changes in systematic risk, an important question 
for future research is whether firm-specific risk sharing also matters for physical investment.  
Optimal smoothing of production risk in an open-capital-market world also requires the 
reallocation of physical capital in accordance with changes in systematic risk.  In the aftermath 
of liberalizations, we should observe relatively more investment by firms whose systematic risk 
falls and relatively less by those whose systematic risk rises.  Consequently, high DIFCOV firms 
should experience faster capital stock growth than low DIFCOV firms following liberalization, 
all else equal.  
However, it is important to remember that the data also show the common shock, or the 
fall in the risk-free rate, to be an equally important source of stock price revaluation.  It is natural 
to ask which is the more important driver of the allocation of physical capital following 
liberalizations, risk sharing or the common shock?  Previous work shows that aggregate 
investment rises following liberalizations (Henry (2000b, 2003)).  But again, aggregate data 
cannot speak to the relative importance of risk sharing versus the common shock.  The firm-level 
identification strategy applied to asset prices in this paper may provide a useful empirical 
approach for disentangling the relative importance of firm versus country-specific effects for the 
reallocation of physical capital when countries remove barriers to international capital 
movements (Chari and Henry (2003)). 
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1Wurgler (2000) provides cross-country evidence on the empirical validity of this view. 
2The partial equilibrium, mean variance framework highlights the critical intuition about 
risk sharing most succinctly.  For a detailed discussion of more general international asset 
pricing models see Adler and Dumas (1983) and Chapter 5 of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). 
3A priori, the impact of the common shock may be ambiguous.  If countries are capital 
scarce in autarky, the average cost of capital may fall if liberalization results in a net capital 
inflow.  On the other hand, if countries have followed policies of financial repression and interest 
rates were kept artificially low, the average cost of capital may increase if the stock market 
liberalization is accompanied by domestic financial deregulation.  See Henry (2000b) for a more 
detailed discussion of these issues. 
4When the representative domestic investor’s portfolio consists of only non-investible 
securities, then DR!  is the rate of return on the portfolio on non-investible securities.  
Consequently, our empirical analysis calculates DIFCOV1 using the covariance of each security 
with the return on the portfolio of non-investible securities. 
5Since the coefficient of relative risk aversion is assumed to be the same across countries, 
the slope coefficient is also implicitly the same and therefore does not require a country-specific 
adjustment. 
6IFC data is used instead of Morgan Stanley Capital Index (MSCI) data, because MSCI 
company-level coverage for emerging markets begins only in January 1992 and therefore post-
dates almost all of the liberalizations.  Worldscope coverage begins even later than MSCI 
coverage. 
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7Anticipated events bias the analysis against finding any revaluation effect. 
8The null hypothesis is that liberalization-month stock price responses come from the 
same distribution as non-liberalization-month stock price changes. 
9The exception is Brazil where the investible weights range from five percent to 56 
percent across firms.   
10Estimations were also performed using years [0], [+1], [+2], and [+3].  These results are 
not reported because earnings in [0], [+2], and [+3] have no explanatory power. 
11See chapter 5 of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for a more extensive list of references. 
 39
 
Figure 1.  Differences Between Covariances with the Market and World Portfolio Help Explain  the  
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Figure 2.  Differences Between Covariances with the Market and World Portfolio Do Not Help 
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Figure 3.  Differences Between Covariances with the Market and Non-Investible Portfolio Do Not Help Explain the 
Repricing of Non-Investible Securities. 
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Table I. 
Decomposition of DIFCOV.  Panel A: Means, Investible firms 
  




( , )i MCOV R R
 











          
Sample 238 0.0183 0.0185 0.0001 0.6202 0.0602 0.1955 0.142 0.047 
          
Argentina 14 0.0476 0.0473 -0.0003 0.9048 -0.0171 0.3486 0.295 0.045 
          
Brazil 21 0.0283 0.0289 0.0005 -0.0924 0.0107 0.2906 0.205 0.044 
          
Chile 9 0.0065 0.0070 0.0005 0.6787 0.0905 0.1252 0.079 0.047 
          
Colombia 5 0.0025 0.0029 0.0004 0.6613 0.0210 0.1079 0.077 0.048 
          
India 39 0.0097 0.0097 0.0000 0.6382 0.0017 0.1411 0.099 0.045 
          
Korea 66 0.0059 0.0061 0.0002 0.5934 0.1326 0.1613 0.086 0.047 
          
Mexico 4 0.0053 0.0055 0.0001 0.1587 -0.0093 0.1584 0.292 0.044 
          
Pakistan 3 0.0002 0.0010 0.0008 0.5868 0.0127 0.0941 0.058 0.048 
          
Taiwan 63 0.0281 0.0283 0.0002 0.8094 0.0854 0.2146 0.158 0.049 
          
Turkey 9 0.0425 0.0414 -0.0010 0.7305 -0.0312 0.2503 0.205 0.053 
          
Venezuela 5 0.0174 0.0177 0.0003 0.6893 -0.1003 0.2115 0.145 0.049 
This table decomposes DIFCOV into its constituent parts.  The variable Number of firms is the number of firms in the specified country.  All other numbers are 
the average value of the given variable across all of the firms in the specified country.  All variables are computed at a monthly frequency.  ( , )i MCOV R R  is the 
covariance of firm i with the local market.  The variable ( , )i WCOV R R  is the covariance of firm i with the world market; iMρ  is the correlation of firm i with the 
local market; iWρ  is the correlation of firm i with the world market; iσ  is the standard deviation of firm i's stock return; Mσ  is the standard deviation of the 
market; Wσ is the standard deviation of the world market. 
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Table I. 
Panel B: Means, non-investible firms 
  




( , )i MCOV R R
 











          
Sample 172 0.0096 0.0105 0.0010 0.4250 0.0479 0.1921 0.142 0.047 
          
Argentina 10 0.0382 0.0384 0.0002 0.7983 -0.0127 0.3683 0.295 0.045 
          
Brazil 23 0.0214 0.0225 0.0011 -0.0963 0.0472 0.3061 0.205 0.044 
          
Chile 17 0.0059 0.0067 0.0008 0.5459 0.1145 0.1366 0.079 0.047 
          
Colombia 15 0.0024 0.0028 0.0004 0.5079 0.0464 0.1412 0.077 0.048 
          
India 23 0.0126 0.0127 0.0001 0.6641 -0.0145 0.1752 0.099 0.045 
          
Korea 6 0.0059 0.0064 0.0004 0.5877 0.0402 0.1878 0.086 0.047 
          
Mexico 27 -0.0025 0.0014 0.0039 0.1025 0.3089 0.2375 0.292 0.044 
          
Pakistan 38 0.0004 0.0007 0.0003 0.5196 -0.0701 0.0930 0.058 0.048 
          
Taiwan 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.158 0.049 
          
Turkey 5 0.0462 0.0456 -0.0006 0.7453 0.0127 0.2580 0.205 0.053 
          
Venezuela 8 0.0162 0.0160 -0.0002 0.6746 -0.1259 0.1858 0.145 0.049 
This table decomposes DIFCOV into its constituent parts.  The variable Number of firms is the number of firms in the specified country.  All other numbers are 
the average value of the given variable across all of the firms in the specified country.  All variables are computed at a monthly frequency.  ( , )i MCOV R R  is the 
covariance of firm i with the local market.  The variable ( , )i WCOV R R  is the covariance of firm i with the world market; iMρ  is the correlation of firm i with the 
local market; iWρ  is the correlation of firm i with the world market; iσ  is the standard deviation of firm i's stock return; Mσ  is the standard deviation of the 





Stock Market Liberalization Dates 
Country  Date of Stock Market Liberalization 
Argentina  September 1989 
Brazil  May 1991 
Chile  October 1989 
Colombia  December 1991 
India  November 1992 
Korea  January 1992 
Mexico  May 1989 
Pakistan  February 1991 
Taiwan  January 1991 
Turkey  August 1989 
Venezuela  January 1990 
Note:  Each date corresponds to the earliest stock market 
liberalization that occurs after 12/88, which is the month when 
the IFC introduced its IFCI index. 
 
           
Table III 
The mean and median stock price response of investible firms to liberalization is larger than that of the non-investible firms. 
 Panel A 
Investible 
Firms 
 Panel B 
Non-Investible 
Firms 
 T-test of 
difference 




























248 0.151 0.121 43  
(0.00) 
 181 0.099 0.086 83  
(0.149) 
 Yes*              
            
Argentina 14 0.639 











 Yes**            
            
Brazil 21 -0.052    
(-1.029)    
-0.048 10  
(0.00) 
 23 -0.198 
 (-3.802)       
-0.048 11  
(0.5) 
 Yes*              
            
Chile 9 0.048  
(1.20)       
0.071 4  
(0.5) 
 17 0.141  
(5.023)       
0.177 8  
(0.5) 
 Yes**            
            
Colombia 5 0.354  
(4.223)      
0.419 2  
(0.5) 
 15 0.287 
(6.312)       
0.310 7  
(0.5) 
 No               
            
India 39 0.208 
(4.663)       
0.172 7  
(0.00) 
 23 -0.024 
(-0.435)       
-0.054 17  
(0.994) 
 Yes***          
            
Korea 66 0.551  
(11.37)        
0.584 7  
(0.00) 
 6 0.069   
(0.406)    
-0.047 3  
(0.656) 
 Yes***          
            
Mexico 5 0.288  
(5.48)      
0.319 2  
(0.5) 
 36 0.247  
(8.813)       
0.223 12  
(0.033) 
 No               
            
Pakistan 5 -0.239 
 (–2.154)       
-0.136 1 
 (0.188) 
 38 -.01 
(-0.478)       
0.004 19  
(0.564) 
 Yes***          
            
Taiwan 69 0.329  
(11.899)       
0.332 4  
(0.00) 
 0 N/A N/A N/A  N/A 
            
Turkey 10 0.654  
(8.532)       
0.577 4  
(0.00) 
 5 0.509  
(10.01)       
0.577 2  
(0.5) 
 Yes***          
            
Venezuela 5 0.446  
(4.223)       
0.451 2  
(0.5) 
 8 0.478 
(4.723)        
0.451 4  
(0.637) 
 No               
Notes:  The mean liberalization return is the average stock price change in Month [0].  T-statistics are given in parentheses.  The median liberalization return is the median 
stock price change in Month [0].  Column 4 in Panels A and B reports the number of firms that experienced liberalization month returns that were below their own historical 
median return.  P-values for sign tests for the median returns are shown in parentheses.  The final column reports results from a T-test of the difference in mean returns across 
investible and non-investible firms in Month [0].  The symbols (*), (**), and (***) refer to 10 percent, five percent and one percent levels of significance.
            
Table IV 









































              
Size 0.015 
 
0.006    0.0004  0.129    0.023  0.014   
 
0.006     0.0002    0.135   0.019  No 
              
Liquidity 2.66 
 
0.43    0.003       26.9   5.11  0.249   0.083       0 2.35  0.364    Yes*** 





0.08 -4.20 5.80 1.02  0.10 
 
0.05 -4.01 6.50 1.11  Yes** 





1.72 -1.27   78.0 6.12  1.48 
 
1.03 -3.30 7.75 1.50  Yes*** 








0.017  0.01 0.004 -0.038 0.069 0.016  Yes*** 
Notes: The variable Size is market capitalization as a fraction of total market capitalization; Liquidity is annual turnover; Earnings Growth is the annual growth rate of 
real earnings; Market to book is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity; DIFCOV is the difference in covariance between the local and world 
markets.  The final column reports results from a t-test of statistical difference of the means of the two sub-samples.  The symbols (*), (**) and (***) refer to 10 percent, 


















    
[+1] -0.217***   
(0.066)      
-0.393***   
(0.090)      
Yes** 
    
[+2] -0.230***   
(0.068)      
-0.113    
(0.099)      
No 
 
    
[+3] -0.106 
   (0.068 )       
-0.014    
(0.101)      
No 
 
    
Constant 0.027   
 (0.024)       
-0.036    
(0.035)      
 
Notes: [+1], [+2], and [+3] report growth rates of real earnings in the first, second, 
and third year following the liberalization.  Country-fixed effects are included in all 
regressions but are not reported.  The F-test reports results about the statistical 
significance of the difference in the mean growth rates for investible and non-
investible firms.  The symbols (*), (**) and (***) refer to 10 percent, five percent 
and one percent levels of significance, repectively. 
        
    
Table VI 
Diversification drives the stock price revaluations for investible firms but not for non-investible firms. 
 Panel A: 
 Month [0] Window 
 
 Panel B: 
Month [0,+1]Window 
 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a)  (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) 
DIFCOV 0.331 




























































































































































































0.176 0.172 0.117 0.196 0.155  0.16 0.137 0.101 0.155 0.115 
            
Number Obs. 410 410 410 410 410  410 410 410 410 410 
Notes for Table VI: The LHS side variable in Panel A is the abnormal return in the liberalization month.  The LHS variable in Panel B is the cumulative 
abnormal return in the liberalization month plus one month.  The symbol DIFCOV is the difference between the historical covariance of firm i's stock return 
with the local market and its covariance with the Morgan Stanley Capital Market Index (MSCI) world stock market index.  Country-fixed effects are included 
in all regressions but are not reported.  INVEST is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for investible firms, and zero for non-investible firms.  The 
variable SIZE is defined as the ratio of that firm’s market capitalization to the total domestic market capitalization as of one year prior to the liberalization 
date.  The variable TURNOVER is defined as the sum of the dollar value of all shares traded over a 12-month period before the liberalization (t -24 to t -12) 
divided by that firm’s total market capitalization.  Earnings Surprise [+1] is the deviation of the growth rate of earnings from its pre-liberalization mean in year 
[+1] following the liberalization.  The symbols (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at the 10 percent, five percent and one percent, respectively.  Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering within parentheses. 
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Table VII 
Diversification drives the stock price revaluations for investible firms but not for non-investible firms.  This result 
continues to hold when abnormal returns are calculated relative to the MSCI world return in the liberalization month. 
 Panel A: 
 Month [0] Window 
 
 Panel B: 
Month [0,+1]Window 
 
 (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a)  (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) 





































































































































































































0.111 0.072 0.142 0.110  0.095 0.094 0.069 0.106 0.079 
Number Obs. 410 410 410 410 410  410 410 410 410 410 
Notes for Table VII: The LHS side variable in Panel A is the abnormal return in the liberalization month.  The LHS variable in Panel B is the cumulative 
abnormal return in the liberalization month plus one month.  The abnormal returns are calculated by subtracting the returns on the MSCI world index from the 
firm returns in: (a) liberalization month and (b) liberalization month plus one month.   The symbol DIFCOV is the difference between the historical covariance 
of firm i's stock return with the local market and its covariance with the Morgan Stanley Capital Market Index (MSCI) world stock market index.  Country-
fixed effects are included in all regressions but are not reported.  INVEST is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for investible firms and zero for 
non-investible firms.  SIZE is defined as the ratio of that firm’s market capitalization to the total domestic market capitalization as of one year prior to the 
liberalization date.  TURNOVER is defined as the sum of the dollar value of all shares traded over a 12-month period before the liberalization (t -24 to t -12) 
divided by that firm’s total market capitalization.  Earnings Surprise [+1] is the deviation of the growth rate of earnings from its pre-liberalization mean in year 
[+1] following the liberalization.  The symbols (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at the 10 percent, five percent, and one percent, respectively.  Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering within parentheses. 
 50
Table VIII 
Diversification drives the stock price revaluations for investible firms but not for non-investible firms.  This result continues to hold 
when abnormal returns are calculated using the world market model estimated in the pre-liberalization window. 
 Panel A: 
 Month [0] Window 
 
 Panel B: 
Month [0,+1]Window 
 

























































































SIZE*INVEST   -0.674 
(0.563) 
 
 -0.513  
(0.572) 
 








  0.791 
(0.740) 
 
 0.502  
(0.746) 
 




















































































Adjusted RSQ 0.103 0.105 0.078 0.127 0.106  0.077 0.084 0.065 0.098 0.075 
Number Obs. 410 410 410 410 410  410 410 410 410 410 
Notes for Table 8: The LHS side variable in Panel A is the abnormal return in the liberalization month.  The LHS variable in Panel B is the cumulative abnormal return in the 
liberalization month plus one month.  The abnormal returns are estimated using a world market return model, which is estimated, in the pre-liberalization window using the 
MSCI world index.  The pre-liberalization window consists of returns in the t=-72 to t=0 window.   The symbol DIFCOV is the difference between the historical covariance of 
firm i's stock return with the local market and its covariance with the Morgan Stanley Capital Market Index (MSCI) world stock market index.  Country-fixed effects are 
included in all regressions but are not reported.  INVEST is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for investible firms and zero for non-investible firms.  SIZE is 
defined as the ratio of that firm’s market capitalization to the total domestic market capitalization as of one year prior to the liberalization date.  TURNOVER is defined as the 
sum of the dollar value of all shares traded over a 12-month period before the liberalization (t= -24 to t= -12) divided by that firm’s total market capitalization.  Earnings 
Surprise [+1] is the deviation of the growth rate of earnings from its pre-liberalization mean in year [+1] following the liberalization.  (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at 
the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering within parentheses. 
 
